The case sheds light on the complex vulnerabilities surrounding proprietary defense technology and the ways in which it may be compromised from within.

According to the plea agreement filed by federal prosecutors, Gong joined the unnamed victim company in January 2023 as a design manager specializing in application-specific integrated circuits for infrared sensors. These sensors are considered essential components in America’s defense strategy, with applications extending to space-based systems designed to detect early-stage nuclear threats and to safeguard aircraft operating in hostile environments.

Gong’s tenure, though brief, raised immediate red flags. Beginning around March 30, 2023, and continuing through his termination on April 26, Gong copied thousands of sensitive files from his company-issued laptop to personal storage devices. Notably, over 1,800 of those files were transferred after Gong had already secured employment with a competitor of his then-employer — raising further concerns about the intent and ultimate destination of the data.

Among the stolen documents were proprietary blueprints for infrared sensors capable of detecting and neutralizing heat-seeking missiles. Many files bore explicit designations such as “PROPRIETARY INFORMATION,” “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,” and “EXPORT CONTROLLED.”

Investigators later discovered these files at Gong’s temporary residence in Thousand Oaks, California, where he had stored them on multiple external devices. Federal prosecutors stressed the high value of the data, noting that the information related to the company’s next-generation sensor technologies could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

But Gong’s activities did not appear to begin with this one employer. In fact, federal documents revealed that between 2014 and 2022, Gong had a pattern of engagement with government-backed “Talent Programs” run by the People’s Republic of China. These initiatives are designed to attract individuals working in high-level scientific and technological fields, often with the goal of advancing China’s national defense capabilities.

In 2014, while employed at a U.S. tech company headquartered in Dallas, Gong sent a proposal to a Chinese research institute that focused on both civilian and military-grade technologies. The plan involved developing “high-performance analog-to-digital converters” similar to those made by his U.S. employer.

In another application submitted in 2020, Gong detailed a project to develop “low light/night vision” sensors for use in both military and civilian scopes — an effort that included a video presentation. That video even referenced a model number associated with a sensor he worked on at a major international aerospace and defense contractor between 2015 and 2019.

In a translated email from 2019, Gong revealed an awareness of the potential risks tied to his actions.

“I took a risk by traveling to China to participate in these Talent Programs,” he wrote.
“Because I worked for an American military industry company, I knew the sensitivity. But I thought I could still do something to help with China’s high-end military integrated circuits.”

Investigators also discovered that Gong had emphasized the military relevance of the converters he intended to develop in China, writing that such technology “directly determines the accuracy and range of radar systems,” and is often integral to “missile navigation systems.”

Assistant U.S. Attorneys David C. Lachman and Nisha Chandran, alongside Trial Attorney Brendan Geary of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, are leading the prosecution.

The case is being investigated by the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office’s Counterintelligence Task Force, with substantial cooperation from the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service, Homeland Security Investigations, and the FBI’s San Francisco Field Office.

As Gong awaits sentencing, the case stands as a stark reminder of the continued challenges facing national security — not just from external adversaries, but also from those who operate within trusted institutions.